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11 Introduction
In his seminal contribution McCallum (1995) studied trade ￿ows between
Canadian provinces and US states and found that the Canadian trade was
heavily biased toward trade within its national borders. This so-called "bor-
der e￿ect" between Canada and the US was con￿rmed in several other studies
(Helliwell, 1996; Hillberry, 1998; Anderson and Smith, 1999). Since then re-
searchers have been interested to know whether similar border e￿ects exist
for trade between other country pairs. However, they have been confronted
with a key data problem: data on regional trade ￿ows are extremely rare.
Wei (1996) introduces an ingenious way to estimate border e￿ects in the
absence of detailed data on intranational trade ￿ows. He uses the di￿erence
between the industrial production of a country and its exports to estimate
trade ￿ows within a country. His methodology allows determining border
e￿ects for countries that do not record regional trade ￿ows. His study and
various subsequent studies (e.g. Chen, 2004) demonstrate that the border ef-
fect also exist for other OECD countries, including countries of the European
Union (EU).
However, Head and Mayer (2002) show that the estimation of the bor-
der e￿ect with the methodology of Wei (1996) depends crucially on certain
distance measures, called internal distance. Estimating internal distance dif-
ferently changed the magnitude of the border e￿ect substantially. As a con-
sequence, for countries with the before-mentioned data limitation the precise
in￿uence of national borders on trade is still unknown.
The main purpose of this paper is to develop a methodology that allows
us determining border e￿ects for EU countries with higher precision. We
show how to improve the estimation of border e￿ects at the example of
France and Germany. For both countries there exists extensive data on
trade ￿ows between each region (RØgion or Bundesland) and the 14 member
States of the European Union prior the enlargement (EU 14). In addition,
transportation ￿ows (by road, rail, inland navigation, and pipeline) between
the regions within France and Germany are documented. Even though these
transportation ￿ows are not recorded in monetary units, but in weight, we
demonstrate that this data can serve as an appropriate approximation for
intranational trade ￿ows. Combined with the ￿rst data source, namely the
trade ￿ows between regions and the EU 14, we possess the necessary data to
estimate the border e￿ects for both countries. Using this new approach we
2study the trade ￿ows between 22 French regions, ’RØgions’, and the EU 14
as well as the trade ￿ows between German Regions, ’Bundesl￿nder’, and the
EU 14.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the relevant
trade literature on the gravity equation as well as on the border e￿ect. Section
3 describes the di￿erent data source that we have exploited for our research
and explains the methodology used. Section 4 presents the estimation of the
border e￿ect in the case of France and Germany. In section 5 we introduce
a new methodology to approximate the value of intranational trade ￿ows.
Before concluding, section 6 studies the evolution of the border e￿ect in the
case of Germany during the years 1997 to 2003.
2 The Border E￿ect Literature
Although the importance of national borders was known long before, it was
only with the contribution of McCallum (1995) that the size of the border
as trade barrier was estimated empirically. McCallum (1995) analyzes trade
between Canadian provinces and between Canadian provinces and US states.
His study is based on the Statistic Canada data set that reports interprovin-
cial trade ￿ows as well as trade ￿ows between each Canadian province and
each state of the United States. He uses a simple gravity equation and in-
cludes a dummy variable that controls for intranational trade. For the year
1988 he estimates that a Canadian province traded on average about 20 times
more with another Canadian province than with a US state which had the
same economic weight and which was located at the same distance as the
corresponding Canadian province.
The magnitude of the border e￿ect between Canada and the US was
most surprising. Before the empirical investigation of McCallum (1995) the
economies of both countries were thought to be heavily integrated. However,
subsequent studies con￿rmed the results of McCallum (Helliwell (1996), Hill-
berry (1998), Anderson and Smith (1999)).
In order to estimate empirically the border e￿ect one needs to know the
trade ￿ows within a country, since they are compared to the trade ￿ows
leaving the country. The availability of data on intranational trade ￿ows is
however very limited. For example, intranational trade ￿ows are not recorded
in EU countries. This data limitation is disappointing for trade economists
since research on border e￿ects for other countries could yield important
3insights. The only possibility to overcome this data problem is to estimate
intranational trade ￿ows, but how?
It is Wei (1996) who provides an appealing answer to this question. His
idea is the following: What is traded within a country must be equal to
the di￿erence between its total production and its total exports to foreign
countries. In order to obtain an estimate of the total production, Wei (1996)
takes the GDP and subtracts the services and the transport sector, which do
not fall under bilateral trade data. This methodology allows Wei (1996) to
approximate the volume of intranational trade ￿ows. In order to approximate
the distance over which these goods are shipped, the author assumes that
within a country the average distance is half of the distance from the economic
center to the border. When a country has a land border with a neighbor, the
author uses a quarter of the distance to the center of the nearest neighboring
country. Finally, to calculate the distance between the economic centers of a
country pair, the great-circle formula is used. Using this approach to study
the magnitude of the border e￿ect for OECD countries during the years
1982 to 1994, Wei (1996) ￿nds that OECD countries traded about 10 times
more with themselves than with foreign countries as predicted by the gravity
model. When using a dummy variable for common language the border
e￿ect drops to 2.6 times. The magnitude of the border e￿ect estimated
by Wei (1996) is therefore considerably smaller than the one calculated by
McCallum (1995) and Helliwell (1996) for the Canada-US border. What is
the reason for this large di￿erence?
Helliwell (1997) uses the same data as Wei (1996), but separates in a more
complete way the border e￿ect and the common language e￿ect. His result
for the year 1990 indicates a border e￿ect of 12.7 (exp(2.54)). Although
this result was closer to the one found by McCallum (1996), economists
realized that the methodology proposed by Wei (1996) hinged crucially on
the measurement of internal distance.
An overestimation of internal distance with respect to international dis-
tance in￿ated substantially the border e￿ect. It also became apparent that
the methodology of Wei (1996) could be highly inconsistent. Nitsch (2000)
takes the example of Denmark and Germany to illustrate the problem of Wei’s
(1996) approach. Since Denmark has only a land border with Germany, the
internal distance of Denmark is calculated taking 0.25 of the distance between
Copenhagen and Bonn which certainly overestimates the internal distance of
Denmark. Another problem arises when the economic centers of two coun-
4tries, which are very di￿erent in size, are close to each other. According to
Wei’s (1996) approach both countries have the same internal distance. This
implies that for example France and Belgium have the identical internal dis-
tance.
In order to tackle these problems researchers have developed two new ways
to measure internal distance. The ￿rst approach consists in taking measures
of internal distance that are based on the geographic area of the country. The
purpose of this approach is to approximate the distance between ￿rms and
consumers within the country’s territory. It is Leamer (1997) in his survey on
growth perspectives of Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) who
introduced the ￿rst area-based measure. 1 Using the same measure of internal
distance, Nitsch (2000) estimates that from the year 1979 to 1990 intrana-
tional trade in the EU was about eleven times higher than international trade
controlling for distance, economic size, common language, and adjacency. He
also observes a gradual reduction in the border e￿ect of the years. Head and
Mayer (2000) also use an area-based measure for their estimation of market
fragmentation in the EU. Following Nitsch (2000) by approximating the geo-
graphic shape of a country by the shape of a disk, the authors assume that all
production is concentrated in the center of the disk and that consumers are
randomly distributed over the disk. For a uniform distribution they obtain
the following formula for internal distance:
p
area/π. Studying the trade
￿ows in the EU during the years 1984 to 1986 the authors report a border
coe￿cient of 2.84, which correspond to an approximately 17 times higher
intranational trade compared to international trade.
The second approach to measure internal distance is based on actual data
on the geographic distribution of economic activity within countries. Wolf
(1997) asks the question, whether a "border e￿ect" can also be observed at
the borders of one US states which other US states. To improve the approx-
1He asks the question whether there is a relationship between per capita GDP and the
distance of the country to the world’s markets. In order to calculate the distances between
countries, it is necessary to estimate how close a country is to itself. Leamer (1997, p. 517)
therefore assumes that countries are circular and that the average distance between two
randomly chosen points within one country follows approximately the following formula: p
area/π. Having determined the internal distances of countries allow the author, by
using a slightly modi￿ed gravity equation, to estimate the relationship between per capita
GDP and being close to world’s markets. He comes to the conclusion that there is a
clear relationship between the two dimensions and therefore predicts high growth rates for
CEEC due to their closeness to markets in the EU.
5imation of distance between US states he uses the road distance between the
largest cities (Wolf 1997). In order to estimate the intra-state trade ￿ows he
calculates the internal distance as the distance between the largest and the
second largest city within the US state. Using a similar speci￿cation to Mc-
Callum (1995) he ￿nds, most surprisingly, a "border e￿ect", of 1.34, which
means that a US state trades nearly four times more within itself than with
other US states. Given that US states have been constitutionally prevented
from erecting trade barriers, this border e￿ect is di￿cult to explain. The
study by Wolf (2000) uses an alternative distance measure and ￿nds very
similar results.
Head and Mayer (2000) study the fragmentation of the internal market
of the EU for the years 1976 to 1995. In order to obtain an appropriate
measure of internal distance the authors use the distance between two regions
and weigh it by the economic size of the regions (Head and Mayer 2000).
Following this approach the scholars hope that the fact that economic activity
is geographically dispersed is captured in a more accurate way. Pooling the
years 1984 to 1986 the results indicate that the border e￿ects were large.
However, for the entire time period 1976 to 1995 the border e￿ect seems to
decrease slowly and halves from about 25 in 1976 to around 12 in 1995.
Finally, Chen (2004), investigating in how far national borders matter in
the EU 1996, takes a similar approach. She follows the EUROSTAT’s division
of the EU 15 into 206 regions. In order to estimate international distances,
she calculates all bilateral distances between the main cities of both countries
using the great circle formula. Then she weighs all distances by the GDP
share of both regions in total. For internal distances she follows a similar
approach. She calculates the great circle distances between the main cities
for each pair of region and weighs the distance by the GDP share of both
regions, giving more weight for economically relevant regions in the country.
Finally, she constructs the average of these distances. Using this approach,
she reports a border e￿ect coe￿cient of 1.80 for seven EU countries (Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the UK) for the year 1996.
The di￿erent methods to approximate internal distance show that until
today there has been little consensus among trade economists on how to
measure correctly internal distance. This dissent is very troublesome, since
the estimated magnitude of the border e￿ect is very sensitive to the value of
the assumed internal distance. Table 1 provides an overview of the border
e￿ects estimated for EU countries in the literature so far. The countries
6Table 1: Overview of Literature on Border E￿ects in the EU
Author(s) Countries Time Period Border E￿ect Variables inclu.
Wei(1996) EU 10 1982-1994 0.97-0.45 adj, lang, rem
Nitsch(2002) EU 10 1979-1990 2.51-1.99 adj, lang, rem
Head & Mayer(2000) EU 9 1978-1995 3.04-2.41 lang
Head & Mayer(2002) EU 12 1993-1995 1.44* adj, lang
Chen (2004) EU 7 1996 1.80 adj
*Pooled Regression
covered by the empirical investigations span from nine (Belgium, Denmark,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and UK) in Head
and Mayer (2000) over ten (including Greece) in Wei (1996) and Nitsch (2000)
to twelve (adding Spain and Portugal) in Head and Mayer (2002). Chen
(2004) examines the trade ￿ows between Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Portugal, Spain, and the UK. The last column shows the variables used in
addition to the corresponding gravity equation (adj stand for adjacency, lang
for language, and rem for remoteness).
Even though the studies cover di￿erent number of countries and di￿er-
ent time periods, it is striking how much the estimated border e￿ects are
diverging. The main reason for this divergence resides in the fact that the
estimation results depend crucially on the measurements used for internal
distance. For example, Head and Mayer (2002) deduce a new measure on
internal distance and ￿nd a much lower border e￿ect that compared to their
approach the methodology chosen by Wei (1996).
Therefore, we conclude that a reliable method to estimate the border ef-
fect in absence of intranational trade data is still missing. This paper presents
an approach that allows us determining the border e￿ect with high precision.
We use data on regional transportation ￿ows to approximate regional trade
￿ows. A good approximation of regional trade ￿ows it not only helpful to im-
prove the estimations of the border e￿ect; it also provides new opportunities
for empirical investigations in the ￿eld of trade and new economic geography.
If we ￿nd a considerable border e￿ect for the two countries studied, how
can it be explained? The empirical studies undertaken so far have had lit-
tle success in ￿nding causes for the border e￿ect in the EU. Border e￿ects
7may be related to border related trade costs, such as tari￿s, contracting and
enforcement costs, di￿erent currencies, non-tari￿ barriers (NTB) to trade,
di￿erent consumer preferences and languages. However, in the case of the
EU all formal trade barriers, such as tari￿s and quotas already were already
removed in 1968. With the increasing common legislation contracting and
enforcement costs should have lost their trade-impeding role. The introduc-
tion of a common currency for eleven out of ￿fteen member States in 1999
should make the use of di￿erent currencies in the EU irrelevant for trade as
well. However, for our estimation we will test whether for the year 2002 the
EURO was already trade promoting or not.
Trade within the EU should neither su￿er from NTB. In 1986 the EU ini-
tiated the Single Market Programme (SMP) in order to reduce all non-tari￿
barriers. Since the end of the program in 1992 there have been two empirical
studies on the impact of the SMP on intra-European trade. FontagnØ et
al. (1998) investigate whether the removal of NTB have increased the inter-
and intraindustry trade in the EU. They observe that the trade volume did
not increase substantially with the SMP, but that the composition of trade
changed considerably. While the volume of intra-industry trade was reduced,
the share of inter-industry trade increased. Head and Mayer (2000) study
the evolution of the border e￿ect over the time period from 1976 to 1995
and ￿nd a signi￿cant reduction of the border e￿ect. However, their ￿ndings
indicate that the SMP had no in￿uence on the decline.
Chen (2004) focuses on technical barriers to trade, one element of NTB,
in order to explain border e￿ects in the EU. She ￿nds that technical barriers
to trade, indeed, increase border e￿ects. However, for our estimations we
do not possess the necessary data to construct a measure of NTB. Linguistic
di￿erences could still play a role for trade in the EU. In the EU 15 countries we
encounter 11 o￿cial languages. In order to control for the di￿erent languages,
we include a dummy variable for common language between trading partners.
Finally, there has been some empirical evidence that consumer prefer-
ences are biased towards domestic products (Head and Mayer, 2000) in the
EU. Head and Mayer (2000) ￿nd a higher border e￿ect for goods of ￿nal
consumption than for other commodities. When we present our results in
section 4, we further exploring the possible reasons for the border e￿ect in
France and Germany.
83 Methodology and Data Sources
3.1 The Gravity Equation
McCallum (1996) used a traditional gravity equation, including country spe-
ci￿c variables (like GDP) as well as bilateral variables (like adjacency), plus
a dummy variable for intra-Canadian trade to estimate the border e￿ect.
However, as Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) point out this traditional
speci￿cation of the gravity equation neglects the di￿erent price indices be-
tween countries. The authors show that since the di￿erence in price indices
can be related to trade barriers, the estimation results are biased in equi-
librium. In order to incorporate their critique, we follow their suggestion
and estimate our gravity equation using ￿xed e￿ects for each exporting and
importing unit. This speci￿cation controls for all di￿erences that are speci￿c
to the trading unit. All country-speci￿c di￿erences are therefore left out and
only bilateral variables are included.
The ￿rst gravity equation we estimate has the following form:
tij = α + β1distij + β2intraij + γiexi + δjimj + µij (1)
distij measures the log of the great circle distance, as described above.
intraij is a dummy variable which is unity if the trade ￿ow takes place
between two regions of the same country and zero if not. The ￿xed e￿ects
for exporting and importing countries are denoted exi and imj, respectively.
Finally, µij denotes a Gaussian white noise error term.
We have to recall that when we derive this gravity equation theoretically,
we assume identical preferences across countries. Therefore, since there is no
preference for homemade goods in the utility function, all bias in consumption
has to come from some sort of barriers to trade. In order to know which trade
barriers contribute to the border e￿ect, we try to control for the trade costs,
that are not related to distance, but may arise when crossing the border. For
this purpose we use an augmented gravity equation of the following form
tij = α+β1distij +β2intraij +β3adjij +β4curij +β5dayij +γiexi+δjimj +µij
(2)
The variables β3 to β5 control for the following bilateral relationships: 2
2Deardorff (1998) discovered that not only the absolute distance between the two
9• Common border: The dummy variable "adj" becomes unity if i and j
share a land border.
• Common currency: The dummy variable "cur" is unity if i and j are
members of the European Monetary Union.
The empirical studies on the border e￿ect in EU countries (see above)
have included several or all of these three additional variables and found that
the border e￿ect remains remarkably stable. 3. We introduce a new variable
that potentially help to explain the border e￿ect.
The ￿rst variable, called day, tries to capture the quality of the business
infrastructure between regions or regions and other EU countries. With busi-
ness infrastructure we mean the opportunities for business people to travel
to other destinations. A high-quality infrastructure between regions or coun-
tries facilitates traveling and as a consequence, ￿rms’ representatives might
meet more easily and frequently, which at the end might stimulate trade.
In order to measure the quality of infrastructure, we study which desti-
nations in other regions or countries can be reached in a one-day round trip.
In other words, is it possible to travel to the other country or region in the
morning and come back the same day? To construct this dummy variable we
check if it is possible to travel from one center by road, rail or airplane to the
corresponding center and return the same day. It is obvious that this measure
is somewhat arbitrary and re￿ects what we thought to be reasonable, as we
have no possible data on the preferences of business people concerning the
time spent on business trips. As a rule of thumb we assume that a one-way
trip by car or train should not take more than four hours and that the ￿ight
time should not exceed two hours.
Finally, it has to be noted that in order to take care of the possibility of
heteroskedasticity, the White’s covariance estimator is applied for all estima-
countries matters for bilateral trade, but also their geographic positions relative to all other
countries. For example, even though the distance between Spain and Sweden is about the
same as between Australia and New Zealand, we expect the second pair to trade more due
to their remoteness from other markets. We do not include a measure for remoteness since
the appropriate measurement and the theoretical underpinning of remoteness remains a
topic of active debate and in the European case no pair of trading partners is located far
from all other trading partners.(Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003 ).
3We have tested other bilateral variables like language or cultural linkages. However,
they were all strongly correlated to the dummy variable ’Region’ and therefore without
additional explanatory power
10tions. We test the robustness of our results using di￿erent speci￿cations of
the trade variable, as explained below. Since in the case of Germany some
observations are zero, we also check whether the inclusion of this variables,
using a Tobit estimation, a￿ects the results.
3.2 Bringing Together International Trade Flows and
Intranational Transportation Flows
One of the main contribution of this study is to introduce several methodolo-
gies how to combine international trade ￿ows with intranational transporta-
tion ￿ows. The absence of data on intra-national trade ￿ows prevents the
empirical analysis of important questions in the ￿eld of trade or economic
geography. This paper show how we can overcome the data problem with
the example of the border e￿ect.
The purpose of our study is to measure the border e￿ects in the case of
France and Germany with respect to other EU countries. This means we
compare to what extent French ’RØgions’ or German ’Bundesl￿nder’ trade
more with themselves than with the other EU 14 countries. In France as well
as in Germany data on international trade ￿ows are recorded on the regional
level. This means each of the 22 ’RØgions’ and each of the 16 ’Bundesl￿nder’
documents all ex- and import ￿ows from and towards all EU countries. For
example, we know what Alsace trades with Italy, or Bavaria with Sweden.
The data include the value in currency units (in thousand Euros) and in
weight (in tons). The data exists at the aggregate, but also at sectoral level
(various digit levels) allowing for a detailed analysis. In the case of France
it is the ’Direction gØnØrale des douanes et des droits indirects’ that collects
the data. In Germany the statistical o￿ce of each ’Bundesland’ records the
data and the National Statistical O￿ce of Germany, called ’Statistisches
Bundesamt’, collects the data. 4
As we have stated above, data on intranational trade ￿ow do not exist
in the case of the EU countries. However, for France and Germany detailed
data (including the mode of transportation) is recorded on intranational com-
modity ￿ows. In both countries inter-regional commodity ￿ows, including the
origin and destination of the ￿ows, are estimated by drawing from strati￿ed
random samples of actual shipment. In the case of France these commodity
￿ows are documented by the ’MinistŁre de l’Equipement, des Transports,
4In both cases the data is not freely available.
11du Logement, du Tourisme et de la Mer, Direction des A￿aires Øconomiques
et internationales’.5 The data is recorded according to the ’Nomenclature
Statistique des Transports’ (NST) and available at the 2-digit level for 10
sectors. In the case of Germany, the commodity ￿ow statistic is recorded by
two national o￿ces. The ’Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt’ in Flensburg reports com-
modity ￿ows which are transported by road. The ’Statistisches Bundesamt’
in Wiesbaden collects the data on commodity transport by rail, waterway,
pipeline and aviation. In contrast to France, in Germany no reliable sec-
toral data on transportation are available according to the information of
the ’Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt’.
Both data sets provide valuable information about the economic exchange
between regions and countries. However, the data sets can not be combined
directly for two main reasons. First, whereas customs data reports the ￿nal
destination of the shipment, national transport data does report a destina-
tion, which is not necessarily the ￿nal one. Second, data on interregional
commodity ￿ows is that it is only recorded in weight units and not in cur-
rency units. How can we tackle both problems?
The ￿rst problem is extremely di￿cult to solve. The fact the national
transport data does not report the ￿nal destination can have severe impli-
cations. To illustrate the possible e￿ects, let us assume that a good is pro-
duced in Stuttgart (Germany, Baden-W￿rttemberg) and then transported
to the harbor of Bremerhaven (Germany, Bremen) in order to shipped to
Ireland. Whereas customs will record the value and weight of the shipment
from Baden-W￿rttemberg to Ireland, the national transport authorities will
report simultaneously a transport intra-national transport ￿ow from Baden-
W￿rttemberg to Bremen.
In order to know what stays in Bremen and what leaves the country, de-
tailed data on production and trade is required. However, we do not possess
this type of data on the level of regions, neither on the country level. The only
way to control for this possible source of error is to omit the intranational
trade ￿ows that could be a￿ected by this error. Therefore we test the robust-
ness of the border e￿ect using only those intranational trade ￿ows that are
most probably free of this potential error. All intranational trade ￿ows that
are directed towards a region within France or Germany without a border
to another country or major harbor most probably stay in that region. For
5Combes et al. (2005) use this rich data to measure the e￿ect of business and social
networks on trade within France.
12example, there is no obvious reason to assume that a considerable fraction
of commodities transported to the region Auvergne (landlocked and in the
center of France) should leave the region again to be exported to European
countries.
An obvious solution for the second problem would be to use all trade
￿ows in tons instead of Euros. However, this method seems to be an clumsy
way to remedy the lack of information we face. Due to the di￿erent eco-
nomic structures of the regional units in France and in Germany, the average
value of one ton exported to EU member countries can di￿er substantially
between regions. This certainly comes at no surprise when we compare, e.g.,
the exports of the highly industrialized Ile-de-France (Paris region) with the
exports of the agriculture prone Languedoc-Roussilon.
In addition to this drawback, using weight units also means that we ignore
the information we have on the monetary value of trade between regions
and EU countries. Exploiting this information, we might obtain a more
appropriate approximation of the monetary value of the intranational trade
￿ows.
The ￿rst possibility to approximate the value of intranational trade ￿ows
is highly simple. We assume that the average unit value of an export ￿ow
from one subnational unit towards the 14 EU member countries corresponds
to the unit value of an export ￿ow from this unit to another subnational unit.
For example, the average unit value of exports from the region Normandy
to the rest of the EU is 1700 Euros. By assuming that this unit value cor-
responds to the unit value of goods traded within France, we can estimate
the value of intra-national trade ￿ows. One might argue that this is a strong
assumption, however, we think that it performs better than models which
are based on the measurement of internal distance. 6
The assumption of identical unit value for EU and intranational implies
that trade between regions corresponds to what regions trade with the EU
14. From a theoretical point of view, this assumption might be well justi￿ed.
For example, if we assumed identical factor endowments for all countries or
regions within the EU 14 and only intra-industry trade.
6Instead of taking the simple average of all unit values, one could also calculate an
average weighted by the magnitude of trade ￿ows. For example, since France is particularly
important for the Bundesland Saarland, the unit value to France is attributed special
weight.
13However, studying closely the data on trade ￿ows between subnational
units and EU 14 countries, we make an interesting observation that contra-
dicts this possibility: the unit value increases considerably the further the
trading partner is located.7
For example, a ton exported from Baden-W￿rttemberg to France is worth
only a third compared to a ton exported to Ireland or Greece. The economic
weight of the importing country apparently does not matter, only distance
does. This observation translates into the hypothesis that the unit value of
trade is determined by the distance between trading partners. Or expressed
di￿erently, the further away the trading partner is located, the more valuable
goods are traded.
In order to test this hypothesis empirically, we specify the following func-
tional form:
contij = α + β1distij + µij (3)
In this equation contij denotes the logarithm of the unit value exported
from region i to country j; distij measures the logarithm of distance between
region i and country j. The parameters α and β are to be estimated, and µij
denotes a Gaussian white noise error term. If we take the example of Bavaria,
we have 14 observations of export ￿ows leaving Bavaria and going to EU 14
countries. Running a simple OLS regression for the equation speci￿ed above
we obtain the result presented in Table 2
As Table 2 shows, there exists a close relationship between the unit value
of trade and distance. The coe￿cient of distij is highly signi￿cant and its
magnitude indicates that the content of trade changes considerably with
distance. With reference to the gravity equation described above we ￿nd
evidence that the forces of attraction literally become less important. Ap-
parently, the further the trading partner is located the higher is the average
value of one ton traded. Expressed di￿erently, for short distances an average
ton traded mainly contains low-value goods. The larger the distance gets,
the more high-value goods enter in the average ton. Distance does not only
in￿uence the trade volume, as predicted by the gravity equation, but distance
7Hillberry and Hummels (2001) make a similar observation when measuring the
weight-to-value ratio of trade ￿ows. The ratio weight-to-value is the reverse to unit values
and therefore logically their results indicate that the lower the weight-to-value ratio the
further the commodities are traded.










Notes: Parameters are estimated by
￿xed e￿ects regressions; *** denotes
signi￿cance at the 1 percent level; ro-
bust standard errors in parentheses; N
denotes the number of observations.
also brings about a change in the composition of trade. We therefore call our
model ’content of trade gravity model’.
A simple dummy variable approach allows us to present the results found
for each region in a clearer way. We therefore construct two samples, one
collecting all export ￿ows from all RØgions towards the 14 EU countries in
tons as well as in Euros for the year 2002, and a second one for all Bundesl￿n-
der respectively. For France we have 22x14 = 308 observations, minus one
observation missing; and for Germany we count 16x14 = 224 observations.
Then, we calculate the average value of one ton corresponding to each ex-
port ￿ow. For example the average ton exported from Baden-W￿rttemberg
towards France is worth 2040 Euros. Using these two samples, we run three
OLS regressions of our content of trade gravity model.
contij = α + β1distij + µij (4)
contij = α + β1distij + β2capi + µij (5)
contij = α + β1distij + β3dumidistij + µij (6)
Equation (4) just restates the above content of trade gravity equation.
In equation (5) we add the variable capi which denotes the per capita GDP
of the exporting region. We include this variable to test whether the level
15of per capita GDP of the exporting region in￿uences the content of trade.
Finally, we estimate our basic equation, but add dummy variables for each
region and interact them with the distance coe￿cient (equation (6)). This
allows each region to have its own slope coe￿cient.
The estimation results are presented in Table 3 for France and in Table
4 for Germany.
Despite the low values of Adjusted R-squared, equations 1F and 1G give
a ￿rst hint that distance may matter for the content of trade. It is surprising
that the estimated coe￿cients are nearly identical in the case of France and
Germany. Adding the variable of per capita GDP of the exporter clearly
improves the results as the Adjusted R-squared of equations 2F and 2G
indicate.
Equations 3F and 3G show the results when the above-described dummy
variable approach is chosen. Since we have for each region only 14 obser-
vations per region, we have not enough degrees of freedom to use a dummy
variable for each region. Therefore, for France we have to "merge" several
regions. We choose regions of similar economic structure and/or geographi-
cal proximity. For Germany, we put together Bremen and Hamburg, which
are two important harbor cities and which share several economic character-
istics. A detailed description of the dummy variables can be found in the
Appendix.
Using dummy variables for all (newly de￿ned) regions, leaving out the
dummy for the regions Ile-de-France and Baden-W￿rttemberg, and interact-
ing them with distance yields an impressive result. Distance explains to a
large extent how the average value of export ￿ows changes. This observa-
tion holds especially in the case of Germany where the Adjusted R-squared
reaches the value of 0.673.
Comparing France and Germany we ￿nd that the intercept and the dis-
tance coe￿cient are again very similar. The content of trade for exports
from the region Ile-de-France and the region Baden-W￿rttemberg seems to
change in an identical way, holding the intercept ￿xed for the whole regres-
sion. What is surprising is the magnitude of the distance e￿ect on the content
of trade. The slope coe￿cients spread from 0.462 (Languedoc-Roussillon) to
0.723 (Ile-de-France) in the case of France, and from 0.397 (Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern) to 0.812 (Berlin) in the case of Germany. Taking all these
observations together con￿rms our ￿rst hypothesis: the content of trade
changes substantially with distance. Equations 3F and 3G also indicate
16Table 3: Content of Trade Gravity Model - France
Variable (F1) (F2) (F3)
C ***3.890 ***-14.102 ***3.701
(0.481) (2.090) (0.417)
































N 307 307 307
Estimation OLS OLS OLS
S.E. 0.793 0.753 0.693
Adj. R2 0.169 0.251 0.366
Notes: Parameters are estimated by ￿xed e￿ects regressions; *** denotes signi￿-
cance at the 1 percent level; robust standard errors in parentheses; N denotes the
number of observations.
17Table 4: Content of Trade Gravity Model - Germany
Variable (G1) (G2) (G3)
C ***3.566 ***-5.912 ***3.506
(1.240) (1.900) (0.400)
































N 224 224 224
Estimation OLS OLS OLS
S.E. 0.907 0.855 0.560
Adj. R2 0.141 0.236 0.673
Notes: Parameters are estimated by ￿xed e￿ects regressions; *** denotes signif-
icance at the 1 percent level; robust standard errors in parentheses; N denotes
the number of observations.
18that the slope coe￿cients signi￿cantly vary from region to region. At ￿rst
sight, there seems to be a relationship between the economic performance
of a region and the steepness of the slope coe￿cient. Economically strong
regions, like Ile-de-France or Baden-W￿rttemberg, seem to display higher
slope coe￿cients than regions with a low economic performance.
How does this observation help to estimate the border e￿ect? Knowing
how the content of trade changes over distance allows us to estimate the
nominal value of our intranational ￿ows. We simply have to assume that
the relationship between the composition of trade and distance also holds
for intranational trade ￿ows. This would imply for example that an average
ton exported from Bavaria to Luxembourg has the same value than one
average ton "exported" to Sachsen-Anhalt, which is located at about the
equal distance. In order to be able to approximate the trade value using this
approach, we estimate the content of trade gravity equation of each of the
22 RØgions and 16 Bundesl￿nder 8
The close relationship between content of trade and distance allows us to
estimate the value of intranational trade ￿ows. We simply use the coe￿cients
of our content of trade gravity model (4), which we estimate for each region,
to convert the trade ￿ows in tons into Euros. Putting together all trade ￿ows
obtained by this approach, we are able to estimate the border e￿ect.
3.3 Data Sources
For our gravity equation we necessarily need information about the distance
between trading partners. For international as well as intranational distances
we use the great-circle formula. Despite the fact that the great-circle formula
neglects the real geography of space, we think that the great circle formula
is su￿cient for our purpose. To compute the distance between two units we
take the longitude and latitude of the center of each region. We consider the
o￿cial capital of the country or region also as the economic center with ￿ve
exceptions.9
8The results are not reported. It has to be mentioned that the statistical ￿t is not
always as good as for the case of Bavaria. The reason for low values of Adjusted R-
squared lies sometimes in special trade ￿ows between one region and one EU country.
For example, in the case of Bremen or Hamburg the value of an average ton leaving for
France is exceptionally high. Evidently, the in￿uence of the aviation industry on trade
￿ows between both regions and France blurs the picture.
9At the national level, we use Frankfurt as the economic capital of Germany and Mi-
lan as the economic capital of Italy. At the regional level, Reims is considered as the
economic center of the ’RØgion’ Champagne-Ardenne, Frankfurt as the economic center
of the ’Bundesland’ Hessen, and Mannheim as the economic center of the ’Bundesland’
19Since we estimated the border e￿ect using a ￿xed e￿ects gravity equation,
we omit all country speci￿c variables, but include the following bilateral
variables: adjacency, common language, common currency, culture, business
infrastructure. To construct ￿rst three variables we exploit the databases of
INSEE, ’Statistisches Bundesamt’, as well as of CIA’s World Factbook. The
data for two other bilateral variables is generated using various other sources.
A more precise description of how the variables are constructed will be found
at the corresponding place below.
Using the above-mentioned sources, we construct eight samples. In the
following we provide a short description of the two main samples used. The
other six samples are constructed similarly and further details are provided in
the respective section. The ￿rst sample covers the aggregate trade between
21 French ’RØgions’ (Appendix 1) and 14 European Union (EU) Member
countries in the year 2002. Thus, we have 21x20 = 420 observations for
interregional trade, plus 21x14x2 = 588 observations for ’RØgions’-EU 14
trade ￿ows, plus 14x13=182 EU-EU trade ￿ows, which sums up to 1190
observations.
The second sample consists of the aggregate trade ￿ows between 16 ’Bun-
desl￿nder’ (Appendix 2) and 14 EU Member countries in the year 2002 and
comprises of 870 observations. There are 16x15 = 240 observations for com-
modity ￿ows between German Bundesl￿nder, plus 16x14x2 = 448 observa-
tions for Bundesl￿nder-EU 14 trade ￿ows, plus 14x13 EU-EU trade ￿ows. In
5 cases no trade was recorded. In order to have a more precise estimation we
include these zero observations in our sample. The next section reports the
results of the various estimations made for the case of France and Germany.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 The Case of France
Applying the methodology described in section 3, we obtain the results sum-
marized in Table 5 for France and in 6 for Germany.
Equation 1F reports the border e￿ect when the trade ￿ows in weight
units (tons) are considered. The value of the variable ’regions’ states that
French regions trade about 15 times (exp(2.723)) more with each other than
predicted by the gravity equation. In equations 2F to 7F the variable trade
is now expressed in Euros. As described before, interregional commodity
Rheinland-Pfalz.
20Table 5: The Border E￿ect in the Case of France
Variable (1F) (2F) (3F) (4F) (5F) (6F) (7F)
Constant ***19.715 ***25.749 ***23.971 ***24.033 ***24.750 ***22.023 ***19.882
(0.475) (0.063) (0.458) (0.535) (0.734) (0.546) (0.615)
Distance ***-1.703 ***-1.359 ***-0.986 ***-0.925 ***-0.896 ***-0.527 ***-0.406
(0.057) (0.050) (0.063) (0.067) (0.098) (0.091) (0.101)
Regions ***2.723 ***2.598 ***2.181 ***2.239 ***3.254 ***2.131 ***1.943









Nbr. of obs. 1190 1190 1190 994 1190 1190 1190
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Adj. R2 0.673 0.604 0.817 0.850 0.837 0.850 0.852
Notes: Parameters are estimated by ￿xed e￿ects regressions; ***,**,* denote signi￿cance
at the 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively; robust standard errors in parentheses.
￿ows are only recorded in weight units. In order to make a conversion in
Euros, we assume that one weight-value of exports to EU 14 corresponds to
a weight-unit of interregional trade ￿ows. Using these trade ￿ows the border
e￿ect remains remarkably stable. Equation 2F indicates that trade between
French regions is about 13 times (exp(2.598)) larger than trade between a
French region and a EU 14 country when adjusted for economic size and
distance.
In equation 3F we use the trade ￿ows that have been obtained applying
the conversion of the content of trade gravity model. This decrease in the
border e￿ect corresponds to our expectation since the di￿erent conversion
results in lower values for intranational trade ￿ows and hence in a smaller
border e￿ect. The mechanism behind lower nominal intranational is the
following: Before, we have simply assumed that the value of an average ton
exported to the EU 14 equals the value of an average ton traded within a
country. If our hypothesis on the change in the content of trade is correct, the
21conversion method applied in section 4 systematically overstates the nominal
value of intranational trade ￿ows. The conversion used in this section leads
to lower nominal values for intranational trade and therefore we would expect
a smaller border e￿ect.
Equation 4F estimates the border e￿ect leaving aside all intranational
transportation ￿ows that might be overestimated because the goods are
shipped further to other EU countries. For example, intranational trans-
portation ￿ows to the region Haute Normandie might be overestimated since
goods are transported to Haute Normandie and then shipped to other des-
tinations. In equation 4F we leave out all those dubious intranational trans-
portation ￿ows and reestimate the border e￿ect using the remaining 994
observations. Applying the content of trade conversion we obtain a border
e￿ect of the magnitude 2.239 and therefore nearly identical to the border
e￿ect in equation 3F.
In equation 5F we check whether distance plays a more prominent role for
interregional trade than for trade between French regions and EU countries.
However, we do not ￿nd any empirical evidence for this possibility. Equations
6F and 7F estimate the gravity equation with additional variables in order
to identify possible reasons for the border e￿ect.
In equation 6F we add the dummy variable for adjacency and common
currency. Using the same legal tender seems to imply an additional border
cost. Out of the 14 possible trading partners, Denmark, Sweden and the
UK have not adopted the EURO. Our estimation indicates that the French
regions do trade more with EU countries that are member of the European
Monetary Union (EMU) than with others. It is interesting to observe that
when these dummy variables are included the border e￿ect decreases slightly
to 2.131.
In equation 7F the day variable is put into the gravity equation. Includ-
ing both variables in our gravity equation yields an interesting result. The
coe￿cient of the variable is highly signi￿cant and of considerable magnitude.
An excellent transportation infrastructure seems to enhance trade by about
34 percent (exp(0.294)). The border e￿ect now falls to 1.943.
In summary, our estimation results suggest that the French economy is
still very much inward biased and not very well integrated into the Euro-
pean market. The transportation infrastructure which seems to follow more
national than European concerns helps to explain part of the border e￿ect.
22Table 6: The Border E￿ect in the Case of Germany
Variable (1G) (2G) (3G) (4G) (5G) (6G) (7G) (8G)
Constant ***26.430 ***32.619 ***30.683 ***31.302 ***30.693 ***27.892 ***28.490 ***27.175
(0.752) (1.133) (1.102) (0.994) (0.734) (0.677) (1.351) (1.477)
Distance ***-2.077 ***-1.837 ***-1.542 ***-1.549 ***-1.543 ***-1.150 ***-1.347 ***-1.334
(0.112) (0.167) (0.162) (0.132) (0.120) (0.099) (0.201) (0.228)
Regions ***1.475 ***1.345 ***1.129 ***1.064 ***1.127 ***6.171 ***1.130 ***1.119









Nbr. of obs. 870 870 870 762 870 870 870 870
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS Tobit OLS OLS OLS
Adj. R2 0.777 0.626 0.622 0.626 0.207 0.625 0.625 0.625
Notes: Parameters are estimated by ￿xed e￿ects regressions; ***,**,* denote signi￿cance at the 1, 5,
10 percent level, respectively; robust standard errors in parentheses. For the Tobit Estimation the
Adj. R2 denotes the Pseudo R2.
4.2 The Case of Germany
The second sample comprises 870 observations and consists of the aggre-
gate trade ￿ows between 16 Bundesl￿nder (Appendix 2) and 14 EU Member
countries. Applying the methodology described above we obtain the follow-
ing results presented in Table 6.
n equation 1G we bluntly use the trade ￿ows denominated in tons in order
to estimate the border e￿ect. Compared to France the border e￿ect is sur-
prisingly low. However, the distance coe￿cient is similar to the one observed
for France and substantially higher than in the other equations estimated.
This result indicates that distance plays a particular trade preventing role
when studying trade ￿ows denominated in tons. 10
Equation 2G reports the border e￿ect when we use the simple conver-
10This is also a hint to the evidence that the content of trade changes considerably with
distance.
23sion using the average unit value. In equation 3G we apply the content of
trade conversion of intranaitonal transportation ￿ows into intranational trade
￿ows. As expected, the border e￿ect drops to 1.129. Equation 4G leaves out
again all trade ￿ows that are potentially overestimated since they might in-
clude ￿ows that leave Germany. Taking the remaining 762 observations and
estimating the border e￿ect again, we obtain a border e￿ect of 1.064, which
hints to the robustness of our results.
As described above, ￿ve zero trade ￿ows are recorded between German
Bundesl￿nder. In order to incorporate these zero trade ￿ows appropriately
in our estimation, we run a Tobit estimation of equation (1). The estimation
results are very close to the ones found in 3G and further corroborate the
overall result.
Trade between German Bundesl￿nder is about 3.1 times (exp(1.129))
higher than with other EU countries when controlled for economic size and
distance. Although German trade is biased signi￿cantly, the border e￿ect is
less than half of the one observed for France.
In equation 6G we interact the region dummy with distance in order
to know whether distance plays a more important role for trade between
Bundesl￿nder than for trade between Bundesl￿nder and the 14 EU countries.
In contrast to the case of France, distance seems to play a considerably more
important role for intranational trade than for international trade.
Equations 7G and 8G again try to examine closer the reasons for the bor-
der e￿ect. Including a dummy variable for adjacency and common currency
does not bring the border e￿ect down. Equation 8G presents the results
when we add the dummy variables day. The dummy variable DAY is con-
structed in the same way as in the case of France. In contrast to France, the
coe￿cient of the day variable is not statistically signi￿cant.
Including all dummy variables brings the border e￿ect down to the value
1.119. We can conclude that controlling for various in￿uences, German Bun-
desl￿nder trade around three times more with themselves as predicted by the
gravity equation.
5 Evolution of the Border E￿ect in the Case of
Germany
Our approach to estimate the border e￿ect by using intranational commod-
ity ￿ows also allows us to analyze its evolution. Learning more about the
24behavior of the border e￿ect over time can give us important insights con-
cerning the progress of integration of an economy into a common market, like
the EU. A falling border e￿ect would indicate that the country becomes less
focused on itself and more willing to substitute intranational trade relations
with international trade relations. Previous studies (see section 2) indeed
￿nd a declining border e￿ect.11
In this section we study the evolution of the border e￿ect in the case
of Germany.12 The time period studied covers the years 1997 to 2003. We
choose this time period for two reasons: First, other studies on the border
e￿ect in the EU (Head and Mayer, 2000; Nitsch, 2000) stop their analysis on
the evolution of the border e￿ect in the year 1995 and 1990, respectively. Our
work therefore intents to provide insights on the most recent development of
the border e￿ect. Second, this period is marked by a further economic,
￿nancial, legal and political integration of the EU. The introduction of the
Euro as legal tender in eleven EU countries was the symbol for this movement.
We construct six additional samples for the years 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000,
2001, and 2003. The number of observations varies in the samples. The lower
number of observations in the years 1997 and 1998 is due to the fact that
the trade relations with Belgium and Luxembourg are documented for each
region as a single record.
The particular case of Belgium and Luxembourg has also an impact on
the distance measure. We consider Brussels as the economic center of both
countries. All distances are then again calculated according to the great
circle formula. Running separate OLS regression for each year, we obtain
the results presented in Table 7.
We estimate for each year the basic gravity equation with a dummy for
intranational trade and ￿xed e￿ects as de￿ned in equation (1). In order to
￿nd a nominal correspondence to the commodity ￿ows denominated in tons,
we use the simplifying assumption that the value of an average ton exported
from one Bundesland to a EU 14 country is equal to the value of an average
ton shipped to another Bundesland. This method might lead to a slightly
in￿ated border e￿ect as discussed in section 4. However, since we are more
11The lowest number in Table 1 not necessarily denotes the last year or pair of years of
observation. Some studies (Head and Mayer, 2000) observe the lowest border e￿ect some
years before the end of the period under observation.
12The reason for choosing only Germany and not France is the fact that, as mentioned
before, data on intranational commodity ￿ows are not freely available. The same is true
for data that report on international trade ￿ows at the regional level. Due to ￿nancial
constraints we were forced to limit our analysis to the case of Germany.
25Table 7: Evolution of the Border E￿ect in the Case of Germany
Variable (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003)
Constant ***32.406 ***31.995 ***32.146 ***32.776 ***31.709 ***32.619 ***32.090
(0.752) (1.083) (0.886) (0.734) (0.846) (1.133) (0.867)
Distance ***-1.784 ***-1.758 ***-1.832 ***-1.904 ***-1.744 ***-1.837 ***-1.776
(0.122) (0.124) (0.131) (0.153) (0.125) (0.201) (0.127)
Regions ***1.129 ***0.774 ***1.613 ***1.410 ***1.714 ***1.345 ***1.560
(0.177) (0.180) (0.207) (0.240) (0.200) (0.269) (0.207)
Nbr. of obs. 812 812 870 870 870 870 870
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Adj. R2 0.783 0.767 0.756 0.710 0.755 0.626 0.747
Notes: Parameters are estimated by ￿xed e￿ects regressions; ***,**,* denote signi￿cance
at the 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively; robust standard errors in parentheses.
interested in the evolution of the border e￿ect than in its exact magnitude
we consider the simple conversion as su￿cient for this purpose.
As expected, for all years the explanatory power of the regressions is
high. The intercept tends to oscillate around the value of 32 and the distance
coe￿cient seems to remain mostly around a value of -1.8. To our greatest
surprise the coe￿cient of the dummy variable Regions seems not to decrease
over the seven years. Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the border e￿ect
graphically. If the economic integration of the EU 15 was gaining ground
during this period, we should expect the border e￿ect to decrease. The two
mayor studies on the border e￿ect in the EU (Head and Mayer, 2000; Nitsch,
2000) ￿nd for the 80s and beginning 90s indeed a considerable reduction in
the border e￿ect. A raise in the border e￿ect in the case of Germany would
indicate that the German economy disintegrates from the EU market and
becomes more and more focused on itself with respect to the EU. How can
we explain this development?
First of all, there may be a technical problem of comparing the results
of the years 1997 and 1998 with the results of the other samples. In these
two years trade ￿ows going to and coming from Belgium are not reported
separately. However, if we treat the results of these two years with some
caution, we notice that the border e￿ect is remarkably stable between 1.4
and 1.7. What could be the reason for the border e￿ect not to decline?
One might conjecture that during the time period under consideration






















27Table 8: Evolution of the Border E￿ect in the Case of Germany (Interaction
Dummies)
Variable (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003)
Constant ***27.507 ***27.141 ***28.092 ***28.249 ***28.292 ***27.892 ***28.501
(0.630) 0.634 (0.579) (0.734) (0.579) (0.677) (0.588)
Distance ***-1.113 ***-1.317 ***-1.187 ***-1.205 ***-1.188 ***-1.150 ***-1.202
(0.071) (0.223) (0.084) (0.081) (0.085) (0.099) (0.086)
Regions ***8.994 ***8.727 ***9.908 ***10.407 ***8.857 ***6.171 ***8.951
(1.224) (1.242) (1.330) (1.537) (1.271) (1.762) (1.333)
Interact. ***-1.303 ***-1.317 ***-1.391 ***-1.509 ***-1.198 ***-0.846 ***-1.239
0.220 0.223 0.243 0.286 0.233 0.325 0.244
Nbr. of obs. 812 812 870 870 870 870 870
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Adj. R2 0.799 0.784 0.771 0.727 0.768 0.627 0.760
Notes: Parameters are estimated by ￿xed e￿ects regressions; ***,**,* denote signi￿cance
at the 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively; robust standard errors in parentheses.
the trade-impeding role of distance has fallen more for intranational trade
than for EU trade. This would mean that Germany as a whole has "come
closer together" due to panoply of reasons like technological progress, en-
hanced transportation infrastructure, etc. As a consequence, the volume
within Germany increased more. To test this conjecture, we run the same
seven OLS regressions as before, but now we add an interaction dummy to
our basic gravity model. We interact the Laender dummy with the distance
coe￿cient in order to allow for a di￿erent slope of the distance coe￿cient for
trade between Bundesl￿nder. Table 8 reports the results of these estimations.
We notice that the interaction dummy decreases. However, in order to be
able to draw any conclusion we need consider two things: First, the evolution
of the intercept is crucial for the interpretation of the estimation results (Buch
et al., 2004). Second, we have to add the distance dummy to the interaction
dummy and compare the results over the years.
Observing the intercept we notice that the resulting number remains sta-
ble around the value of 28. The distance variable is also stable around 1.2
and we may conclude that distance has played the same trade-preventing
role over the whole time period. However, the interaction dummy seems to
lose strength, especially the last three years. This could be interpreted as if
28the volume of intranational trade has been rising faster than the volume of
EU trade. However, this result seems not to have it origin in a decrease in
the trade-preventing role of distance.
Finally, the fast economic development of countries close to Germany,
which in their majority became Member States of the EU in May 2004, could
o￿er another explanation for the observed evolution of the border e￿ect. In
the time period under consideration total trade with these countries grew
probably a lot faster than the total trade with the EU 14. In other words,
the German economy shifted its attention "eastward", at the expense of an
intensi￿cation of trade relations with the EU 14 countries. This development
must ultimately lead to an increase in the border e￿ect between Germany
and the EU 14. However, this explanation is still very hypothetical and needs
to be tested thoroughly.
6 Summary and Conclusion
The main purpose of this paper was to develop a methodology that allows
us to estimate border e￿ects with greater precision using existing data. Ap-
plying this methodology to the case of France and Germany has yielded two
main results. First, the German economy is seems to be better integrated in
the EU market than its French counterpart. Second, in the case of Germany
the border e￿ect has been not been decreasing over the last seven years.
However, this study constitutes only a beginning. The availability of data
on intranational commodity ￿ows in EU countries o￿ers the opportunity to
estimate border e￿ects for other countries. Since our methodology is a more
direct way to determine border e￿ects, it allows studying closer the reasons
for border e￿ects. In our study we have identi￿ed new factors that contribute
to the border e￿ect, but much work remains to be done. However, we are now
able to integrate easily more valuable data, for example on di￿erent consumer
price between regions (Engel and Rogers, 1996, for the case of Canada-US
trade) and come to a much richer analysis. Finally, a better understanding
of the border e￿ect would it make possible to know more about the welfare
implications of border e￿ects.
Future studies could apply our methodology to data that covers longer
time periods than seven years. As our results suggest, knowing more about
the evolution of the border e￿ect can give us important insights in the dy-
namics of trade. Knowing if an economy integrates or disintegrates is not
29only a valuable piece of information for trade economists, but also for political
decision makers.
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Bretagne Nord-Pas de Calais
Centre Provence-Alpes-C￿te d’Azur


















Haute Normandie + Basse Normandie
Nord-Pas de Calais + Lorraine




Appendix 4￿List of "Merged" ’Bundesl￿nder’
Name Name
Bremen + Hamburg
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